

ROUTING

Top Secret 917

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	HR		
2			
3			
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

25X1

25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Wednesday June 8, 1977 CG NIDC 77-132C

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, June 8, 1977.

25X1
25X1

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

TURKEY: Unofficial Election Results Page 1

HORN OF AFRICA: Tass Statement Page 2

YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's Travel Plans Page 3

25X1

ETHIOPIA: Transport Endangered Page 7

PORTUGAL: Collapse Avoided Page 10

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

TURKEY: Unofficial Election Results

25X1 [] *There were no decisive winners in Sunday's parliamentary election in Turkey, and the country seems to be in for another period of relatively weak caretaker and coalition governments.*

25X1 [] Complete unofficial returns give opposition leader Ecevit's center-left Republican Peoples Party a comfortable parliamentary plurality. His party gained 28 seats and will apparently fall 13 seats short of the 226 needed for a parliamentary majority.

25X1 [] Ecevit will spare no effort to attract enough independents, defectors from other parties, and splinter-party deputies to form a working majority. The realities of parliamentary arithmetic, however, will probably require him to turn once again to the right-wing, Islamic-revivalist National Salvation Party.

25X1 [] As they proved in their eight-month coalition in 1974, Ecevit and Salvationist leader Erbakan are unlikely partners in both temperament and ideology. Each, however, seems capable of making the necessary adjustments and concessions for the sake of gaining power.

25X1 [] Negotiations between the two will be difficult and may be protracted as well. Ecevit--having come so close to winning outright--will jealously protect his prerogatives, while Erbakan, although his party's parliamentary strength is down, will still be in a position to sell his votes to the highest bidder. Erbakan could switch to Justice Party leader Demirel if Ecevit's terms appear unsatisfactory.

25X1 [] Another Ecevit-Erbakan coalition would have no assurance of longevity. Both men would strive to make any coalition protocol as specific as possible, in order to minimize the bickering that was a major factor in the demise of their earlier partnership. Erbakan might be slightly less feisty than before, but dissension and indecision would probably prevail.

25X1 [] If Ecevit is unsuccessful in forming a government, Demirel will try. Demirel's Justice Party scored dramatic gains

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

[]

over 1973; as an aggregate, the four center-right parties of his current government now hold an absolute majority. There would be considerable reluctance in all parties--particularly Erbakan's--to recreate the stresses of the former coalition, but the lure of power would probably win out.

25X1

[] There may be talk in the coming days of alternatives to government by coalition--a minority government or a "grand coalition" of Ecevit's and Demirel's parties. The principal party leaders will probably give serious consideration to them, however, only if other options prove unworkable. []

25X1

HORN OF AFRICA: Tass Statement

25X1

[] *Moscow's decision to issue an authoritative Tass statement warning Sudan not to initiate hostilities against Ethiopia provides further evidence of the USSR's growing commitment to Ethiopia, but it will add to Soviet problems in the Horn of Africa.*

25X1

[] The Tass statement, which was issued on Sunday and published in *Pravda* on Monday, accused Sudan and its "imperialist and other reactionary" backers of supporting the Eritrean insurgents in Ethiopia and preparing for an armed attack on Ethiopia's western border. Citing the recent Soviet-Ethiopian declaration of friendship, it warned that the USSR would hold Sudan responsible for any outbreak of hostilities.

25X1

[] The Tass release was the first authoritative Soviet attack on Sudan since the USSR recalled its ambassador from Khartoum last week, and coincides with Sudanese President Numeiry's visit to Peking. Both the Chinese and Sudanese have used the visit as an opportunity to denounce Soviet policy in Africa.

25X1

[] In an apparent effort to avoid offending Somalia, the Tass statement stressed that the threat to Ethiopia is on its western border. The statement nonetheless will not sit well with the Somalis--particularly since the Soviets issued it soon after Somali Vice President Samantar's recent visit to the USSR. Partly as a signal to the Soviets, the official Somali news agency on Monday reiterated Somalia's opposition to

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

the present government in Ethiopia and warned that it would continue to support ethnic Somali insurgents inside Ethiopia regardless of whether Ethiopia receives external support.

25X1

[] We have little information on what took place during Samantar's visit. The Soviet decision to publicize the visit and the fact that Samantar met with General Secretary Brezhnev suggest that the Soviets were at least partially satisfied with the results of the visit and presumably have promised more military and economic aid. []

25X1

YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's Travel Plans

25X1

[] *Yugoslav President Tito intends to visit the USSR, China, and North Korea beginning August 25. The Peking stop will be Tito's first trip to China and caps five years of gradually improving state relations.*

25X1

[] Tito will visit China in his capacity as head of state because the two communist parties still do not have formal ties. His visit nonetheless will institute highest level contacts and could have an important symbolic significance for Yugoslavia, which faces a potentially troubled succession and fears Soviet meddling.

25X1

[] Tito, to enhance his prestige, may be tempted to portray his visit to China as a mediating effort between Moscow and Peking, but the principals would probably reject the idea. There is likely to be considerable speculation about a Yugoslav mediation effort since his initial stop will probably be in the USSR and he is also likely to stop off in Moscow on his way home.

25X1

[] The Yugoslavs will strenuously deny any anti-Soviet motive in improving relations with China. They will be particularly wary of any hints from Peking that Tito is siding with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Yugoslavs do not want to arouse Soviet fears that they might be used to increase Chinese influence in Eastern Europe. A Yugoslav approach to Peking in 1972 drew Soviet condemnations.

25X1

[] Tito's stay in the USSR will probably be devoted to restoring momentum to bilateral relations, which the US embassy

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

in Belgrade recently characterized as in a state of "slight numbness." The visit to Yugoslavia by General Secretary Brezhnev last November was marred by subsequent Yugoslav leaks suggesting that Belgrade had flatly rejected Soviet requests for naval bases and military overflight rights. Tito may feel--in the wake of highly praised visits to Yugoslavia by Vice President Mondale and West German Chancellor Schmidt--that it is time to touch base with the Soviets again.

25X1

[] The North Korean trip will probably see Tito tread a narrow line by backing the North's claims against the South while arguing that differences with South Korea should be settled peacefully. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

ETHIOPIA: Transport Endangered

25X1

The recent attacks against the railroad that runs between the port of Djibouti and Addis Ababa are the most serious blow thus far to Ethiopia's transportation links with the Red Sea. The railroad carries roughly half of the country's total freight traffic, excluding oil. Ethiopia has had difficulty for some time in maintaining overland links with its two major ports in the north, which are in rebellious Eritrea.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

[] Early this month, at least three bridges on the railroad line were damaged in attacks that almost certainly were carried out by Somalia-based insurgents. More attacks would quickly cause shortages of aviation gasoline for both civilian and military aircraft; disruption in the country's trade would be widespread.

25X1

[] The Eritrean insurgents and a shortage of trucks have inhibited attempts to rely more heavily on Ethiopian Red Sea ports instead of Djibouti.

25X1

[] The attack on the bridges could be the beginning of increased pressure on the rail line. There is no easy way to provide adequate security for the railroad because it has several bridges and runs through remote areas. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

PORTUGAL: Collapse Avoided

[redacted] Portuguese Prime Minister Soares insists that his minority Socialist government will not collapse under pressures from both right and left because it retains the support of President Eanes. Parties to the right of the Socialists have softened their threats to oppose the government in order to allow the National Assembly to pass badly needed economic legislation. The opposition parties may try to force government changes later this year, but probably not without Eanes' backing.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

[] Soares declared in a speech last weekend that his minority government is solid. He admitted to the US ambassador, however, that the government is not as cohesive or effective as it should be. He said a major overhaul would only slow the progress the Socialists are making on the economy and in curtailing Communist influence in labor and agriculture. Important legislation on these matters will be considered by the National Assembly before the legislative session ends on July 23.

25X1

[] In Soares' opinion, the two parties to the right of the Socialists--the centrist Social Democrats and the conservative Social Democratic Center--created an artificial government crisis by threatening to oppose the government if the Socialists refused to consult other parties on government legislation. He said the Socialists had already obtained the support they needed for key measures from middle-level Social Democratic and Social Democratic Center deputies.

25X1

[] Leaders of those parties apparently agreed that needed legislation was more important than challenging the Socialists now. Following a second joint meeting last week, the opposition parties announced they would allow their deputies to vote for individual measures, although they made it clear that this did not signal overall acceptance of the Socialists' legislative program.

25X1

[] The two parties are still not happy with the Socialists' refusal to pull closer to them, but they deny they want a censure motion or to force early elections. They apparently hoped their opposition would force President Eanes to make some changes in the government.

25X1

[] According to Soares, Eanes continues to support the Socialist government as the best alternative for the time being. He said speculation that the President would replace the Socialists was prompted by Eanes' efforts to maintain a proper distance from them. Eanes has said in the past he wants the first constitutional government to stay in office as long as possible to avoid giving the impression that the new Portuguese democracy is unstable. Eanes' support probably ensures the minority government's survival at least until the new legislative session begins in October.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

25X1

[] The Communists, in contrast to parties on the right, will vote against the Socialist legislation, but they are reluctant to take any action that might lead to the formation of a more conservative government. At their national conference last weekend, the Communists repeated earlier offers to work with the Socialists but insisted as usual that in return the Socialists implement a more radical program.

25X1

[] The Communists appear willing to take stronger actions to convince the Socialists to withdraw legislation they say will turn back "revolutionary gains" in labor and agrarian reform. The Communist-dominated labor confederation has announced a day of demonstrations and work stoppages on June 22 to protest the state of the economy and the alleged ineffectiveness of Socialist legislation.

25X1

[] The Socialists are unlikely to be swayed by the Communists' arguments and appear to accept the fact that they will lose some of their left wing in the legislative votes. Soares is convinced the defection of perhaps as many as ten leftist Socialist deputies will not affect the party's ability to govern. []

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010014-0

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret